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I. INTRODUCTION
In May 2004, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) announced a
final rule to be published in the Federal Register that would establish eligibility
criteria for persons seeking to donate sperm and other human cells and tissues.'
Concurrently, the FDA issued a draft guidance document "that provides recom-
mendations for complying with the requirements . . .,,;2 in the final version of
that guidance document, the FDA enumerates twenty-nine "risk factors," and
instructs interviewers to screen potential donors for each identified factor.3 The
FDA affirmatively states that these "conditions and behaviors increase the do-
nor's relevant communicable disease risk."
4
In its guidance document, the FDA identifies "men who have had sex
with another man in the preceding 5 years" (MSMs) as the number one risk fac-
tor.5 The FDA does not, however, make a distinction between MSMs who prac-
tice safe sex and those who have unprotected sex, nor does it identify men who
have had sex with women-be it with one or many female partners, protected or
unprotected-as one of its twenty-nine risk factors.6 Ultimately, when the final
rule was published in the Federal Register, the FDA did not include the pro-
posed risk factors it identifies in either its draft or final guidance documents as
I Eligibility Determination for Donors of Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-
Based Products, 69 Fed. Reg. 29, 786 (May 25, 2004) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 210, 211,
820, 1271) [hereinafter Preamble]. The rule became effective on May 25, 2005.
2 FDA Finalizes New Rule on Donor Eligibility for Human Tissues and Cells,
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/NEW01070.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2008).
3 DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: ELIGIBILITY DETERMINATION FOR DONORS OF HUMAN
CELLS, TISSUES, AND CELLULAR AND TISSUE-BASED PRODUCTS (HCT/Ps) 1, 16-21 (May 20, 2004)
[hereinafter Draft Guidance Document]. The document is the predecessor to several earlier issued
guidelines, and the FDA invited interested parties to submit comments during the ninety-day
period following its publication. In August 2007, the FDA released the final version of the guid-
ance document to accompany the donor eligibility rule. See GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY:
ELIGIBILITY DETERMINATION FOR DONORS OF HUMAN CELLS, TISSUES, AND CELLULAR AND TISSUE-
BASED PRODUCTS (HCT/Ps) 1 (Aug. 8, 2007), http://www.fda.gov/Cber/gdlns/tissdonor.pdf [here-
inafter Final Guidance Document].
4 Final Guidance Document, supra note 3, at 14.
5 Id.
6 See id. at 14-20.
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an outright bar to donor eligibility. 7 Instead, the rule simply states that persons
who screen donors "must" review medical records for "risk factors ... for rele-
vant communicable disease[s] .... ,8 Although subtle, the logical extension and
effect of the rule's language is that a person who "must" screen for "risk fac-
tors" will turn to the FDA's guidance document to determine what those risk
factors are.
The purpose of this Note is to highlight several litigation strategies that
might be effective in ending discrimination against gay and MSM potential
sperm donors. The Note does not advocate for one litigation strategy over an-
other, nor does it purport to solve all of the problems involved with each. The
overarching goal is to make a potential litigator aware of some of her strategic
legal choices, to highlight the advantages and disadvantages of each choice, and
to advocate for creative lawyering. The Note will discuss claims against the
FDA under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and it will also analyze
claims against the individual sperm banks and clinics that have adopted the
FDA's recommended eligibility requirements under the U.S. and various state
constitutions.
Section II begins by giving a brief overview of the FDA's guidance
document, its promulgated rule, and the preamble to that rule, and it will high-
light many of the inconsistencies and problems contained therein. Section LII
will lay out the framework for a lawsuit, and it will provide an example of a
"perfect" plaintiff and his accompanying story, coupled with the reasons why he
may be particularly persuasive in front of a judge or jury. It employs a legal
narrative, and discusses the advantages of using stories to help an audience re-
late, sympathize, and change its mindset.
In Section IV, the Note outlines a claim against the federal government
under the APA, which authorizes judicial review of "final agency actions." 9 It
first discusses the principles and case law that an attorney may use to argue that
the FDA's informal action-its recommended eligibility determination-is a
final agency action. It then makes the argument that this final action is arbitrary
and capricious, and is therefore unlawful.
The Note then switches its concentration from the government to public
and private reproductive facilities that have incorporated the FDA's recommen-
dation into their official eligibility requirements. Section V focuses on claims
under the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution's Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments. To show that an eligibility requirement that excludes
MSM donors is discriminatory, it puts forth two potential arguments: the crite-
rion violates the fundamental right to procreate articulated in Skinner v. Okla-
homa,'0 and it violates a right to intimate, sexual privacy that the Supreme Court
7 Preamble, supra note 1.
8 21 C.F.R. §§ 1271.50(a) - (b)(1)(i), 1271.75(a)(1) (2007) (emphasis added).
9 5 U.S.C.A. § 704 (West 2007).
10 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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arguably alludes to in Lawrence v. Texas. 1 The Note emphasizes, however, that
the Constitution has limited domain over private parties, and it discusses the
various arguments available to show how private establishments may engage in
the requisite "state action." Contained in the subsections of Section V, the Note
examines similar legal theories but does so under various state constitutions,
highlighting the advantages and disadvantages of this choice-of-law strategy. It
comments that the rights guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution merely repre-
sent the floor, and that states can and often do extend these rights under their
own constitutions. In addition, it notes that many state constitutions do not re-
quire state action to reach private discrimination, and many more are ambiguous
about such a requirement.
The Note concludes in Section VI with an analysis of the costs and
benefits of the various litigation strategies, but stresses that the tactics listed
herein are not all-inclusive; a more searching inquiry into various states' anti-
discrimination statutes and constitutional provisions may reveal alternative
means by which an attorney can bring a claim and end the inequality at issue.
Although it would be ideal, the Note does not ultimately unearth a clear winning
strategy. Instead, it is a "guidance document" unto itself, and it is intended to
help an attorney choose the litigation strategy that will best serve her client.
II. BACKGROUND
The FDA was originally known as the "Division of Chemistry," an en-
tity primarily responsible for scientific research. 12 In 1906, Congress jump-
started the FDA's modern era when it enacted the Federal Food and Drugs Act,
transforming the agency into a regulating body. 13 Today, the FDA is an agency
of the Department of Health and Human Services responsible for regulating
food, drugs, cosmetics, animal feed, biologics, and many other similar prod-
ucts. Its primary purpose is to protect and promote the public health.
15
In 2004, the FDA released a draft industry guidance document concern-
ing eligibility criteria for sperm donors which listed "men who have had sex
with another man in the preceding five years" as the number one risk factor that
should be screened.16 The guidance document recommended that any person
who possesses any of the noted risk factors should be considered ineligible to
I 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
12 See John P. Swann, History of the FDA, http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/historyoffda/fulltext.
html (last visited Nov. 18, 2006).
13 See id. See also Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, 21 US.C.A. §§ 1-15 (West 2007)
(repealed 1938).
14 See Swann, supra note 12; U.S. Food and Drug Administration, http://www.fda.gov/default.
htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2006).
15 Id.
16 Draft Guidance Document, supra note 3, at 16.
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donate.' 7 Soon after, the FDA's final rule concerning eligibility determinations
for donors of human cell and tissue-based products went into effect.'8 In the
preamble to that rule, the FDA explicitly declines to amend previous guidance
documents that list MSMs as a risk factor, insisting that no new data warrants a
revision.19 Notably, however, the FDA makes the following acknowledgment:
Some comments disagreed with considering homosexual men to
be "high risk donors" and disputed the scientific basis for ex-
cluding these men as donors. Many comments cited the effi-
cacy of the blood test for HIV, with retesting after a 6-month
quarantine, although one comment noted that HIV antibody
testing is imperfect. Many comments disputed the public health
benefits of the rule, although some applauded the agency for
trying to craft safeguards to protect the public. Other comments
asserted that the regulations would abridge the reproductive,
civil, or constitutional rights of both donor and recipient, but
did not provide an explanation of the scope of those rights or a
legal analysis of how this rule would affect them. Many com-
ments argued that the proposed regulations were discrimina-
tory.
20
The FDA's mission statement declares that its primary purpose is to
protect and advance the public health.2' Unfortunately, the FDA's attempt to
protect and advance public health by excluding MSMs from the pool of avail-
able sperm donors does not comport with that stated mission, and has instead
unfairly disadvantaged member of the gay community and those who do not
identify within a narrow, sexuality defining box.22 Although the FDA insists
that excluding MSMs from the donor pool reduces the risk of HIV and AIDS
transmissions, this proposition is unsupported by the facts.23 To prevent disease
transmission, the FDA has imposed stringent blood tests and waiting periods
17 Id.
18 21 C.F.R. §§ 210 et seq.
19 Preamble, supra note 1, at 29,806.
20 Id. at 29,805 (emphasis added). The FDA then states, "In response to the comments sug-
gesting that FDA should allow establishments to rely on HIV test results alone, or on quarantine
and retesting, without screening for risk factors, FDA rejects that approach at this time." Id. at
29,806.
21 FDA's Mission Statement, http://www.fda.gov/opacomlmorechoices/mission.html (last visi-
ted Oct. 29, 2007).
22 Throughout this Note, the terms "gay," "MSM," and "sexual orientation" are used inter-
changeably to be inclusive of the various groups of men affected, and the labels to which many
prescribe.
23 See infra Part IV.C (making the argument that the agency action is arbitrary and capricious
because it is not rationally based on the facts).
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upon anonymous sperm donors.24 A donor's blood is tested seven days before
or at the time of the donation, his specimen is frozen for six months, and his
blood is then tested a second time. 25 The FDA requires the six-month waiting
period to ensure that if a person newly-infected with HIV does not test positive
at the time of the donation, the virus or its antibodies will have appeared by the
end of the quarantine period.26 Additionally, the FDA explicitly recommends
that fertility clinics use new forms of testing that can detect HIV and HCV anti-
bodies within just days or weeks.
Moreover, in a report released in February 2004, the Center for Disease
Control (CDC) stated that the majority of reported HIV infections worldwide
are transmitted by sexual contact between men and women.2 8 The data con-
tained in the report further showed that within the United States, thirty-five per-
cent of HIV infections diagnosed between 1999 and 2002 were transmitted by
sexual contact between males and females; of the 101,877 reported diagnoses in
twenty-nine states, 36,084 were the result of heterosexual conduct.2 9 While the
CDC's report provides only part of the whole story,3° it is an illuminating and
effective tool in demonstrating that the threat of HIV transmission is not limited
to members of the gay or MSM communities. The report affirmatively proves
that notions of HIV as a "gay disease' ' 31 are outdated, inaccurate, and, quite lit-
24 21 C.F.R. §§ 1271.80, 1271.85(d) (West 2007).
25 Id. The safeguards in place for testing sperm donors dwarf the precautions taken when
testing blood donors where only one specimen is required from any potential donor. See John G.
Culhane, Bad Science, Worse Policy: The Exclusion of Gay Males From Donor Pools, 24 ST.
Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 129, 137-38 (2005).
26 See Suitability Determination for Donors of Human Cellular and Tissue-Based Products, 64
Fed. Reg. 52,696, 52,706 (proposed Sept. 30, 1999) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 210, 211,
820, 1271); See also Culhane, supra note 25, at 137-38.
27 Letter from John Givner, Staff Attorney, Lambda Legal, to Div. of Dockets Mgmt.,
Food and Drug Admin. 1, 3-4, 4 n. 4 (Aug. 23, 2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/
DOCKETS/dailys/04/augO4/083004/04d-0193-c017-voll.pdf. The letter was written on behalf
of the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, the Gay and Lesbian Medical Association, the
Human Rights Campaign, and the National Center for Lesbian Rights.
28 Heterosexual Transmissions of H1V - 29 States, 1999-2002, MORBIDITY MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. (CDC, Atlanta, Ga.), Feb. 20, 2004, at 125, http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/
mm5306.pdf.
29 Id. The data represents HIV and AIDS diagnoses made over the course of four years in the
twenty-nine states that met the CDC's reporting standards.
30 Notably, the report does not break down the statistics in terms of reported HIV cases in
relation to the per capita population of the identified groups, nor does the report specifically in-
clude statistics for men and women who have sex with members of both sexes. Furthermore, the
report does not explain how the data might take into consideration inaccurate self-reporting of
sexual activities and partners.
31 For an analysis of how pop culture, for example, has contributed to the creation and per-
petuation of the once (and arguably still) common belief that HIV and AIDS are "gay diseases,"
see Richard Goldstein, The Implicated and the Immune: Cultural Responses to AIDS, 68 THE
MILBaNK QUARTERLY 295 (1990). The author notes that jokes about gays and HIV continue to
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erally, a danger to public health. Why, then, has the FDA failed to also address
these alarming statistics in its final guidance document concerning risk factors?
Rather than modem science, the FDA's stance on gay sperm donors is
based on archaic stereotypes and generalizations. It continues to classify MSMs
as high risk, but refuses to acknowledge the increasing rate of heterosexual HIV
transmissions, as well as the reality of today's technology. The policy also em-
bodies a moral disapproval of certain kinds of sexual behavior over others, and
lends support to recent criticism that, "[t]he once solid reputation of the U.S.
agency and the science it produces has come to be regarded with suspicion due
to the crumbling of the divide between science, politics, and religious ideol-
ogy.' ' 32 While its policy purports to promote public health, the truth is that the
FDA has only succeeded in arbitrarily stigmatizing and excluding a minority
group from participating in a socially valuable service.
III. FRAMING THE ISSUE WITH STORYTELLING AND THE "PERFECT" PLAINTIFF
Many jurisprudential scholars have long emphasized the importance of
personal experiences, alternative voices, and nontraditional views.33  For in-
stance, Professor Charles R. Lawrence Ell of Stanford Law describes the litiga-
tion process as "highly formalized storytelling," 34 and states that "one story in-
thrive in pop culture, and, in fact, "in some circles, 'gay' has come to stand for 'got AIDS yet?"'
Id. at 303.
For a more modem example showing how society frequently seeks to hold gays responsible
for the spread of disease, see the January 2008 response to scientists' discovery of a new strain of
drug-resistant staphylococcus known as MRSA. "On Monday, a team of researchers led by
doctors from the University of California at San Francisco announced that gay men were 'many
times more likely than others' to acquire a new strain of drug-resistant staphylococcus, a nasty,
fast-spreading and potential lethal bacteria known as MRSA USA300." Jesse McKinley, After
Linking New Strain of Staph to Gay Men, University Scrambles to Clarify, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20,
2008, at A16. Following the announcement, many anti-gay groups quickly latched onto the report
as ammunition for their homophobic causes, "citing the 'sexual deviancy' of gay men as leading
to AIDS, syphilis and gonorrhea," and commenting that "[t]he medical community has known for
years that homosexual conduct, especially among males, creates a breeding ground for often
deadly disease." Id. In response to the report's widespread distribution by the media and the
public's reaction, scientists at the University, surprised by the spin, attempted to clarify their
findings. The University quickly issued an apology, noting that the release "contained some
information that could be interpreted as misleading," and one of the report's authors, Dr. Henry
Chambers, stated that, "[W]e deplore negative targeting of specific populations in association with
MRSA infections or other public health concerns." Id.
32 Alastair J.J. Wood et al., A Sad Day For Science at the FDA, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1197,
1199 (2005). This article was written in response to the FDA's denial of an application to make
emergency contraception available over-the-counter to women of any age. Michelle Fine & Sara I.
McClelland, The Politics of Teen Women's Sexuality: Public Policy and the Adolescent Female
Body, 56 EMORY L.J. 993, 1012, 1014 (2007).
33 ROBERT L. HAYMAN, JR., NANCY LEVIT & RICHARD DELGADO, JURISPRUDENCE CLASSICAL
AND CONTEMPORARY: FROM NATURE LAW TO POSTMODERNIsM 461-62 (2d ed. 2002).
34 Charles R. Lawrence III, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholarship as Struggle, 65
S. CAL. L. REV. 2231, 2278 (1992).
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vites another as people's worlds weave the tapestry of human connection."
35
Storytelling humanizes legal actors, and provides the faces and voices absent in
the "sterile world of doctrines and rules. 36 Particularly for gays and other mi-
nority groups, the "right" story can help people deconstruct their mindsets, show
that what they believe is "ridiculous, self-serving, or cruel, 37 and provide "the
,,38way out of the trap of unjustified exclusion. An attorney who gives life to her
plaintiff and emphasizes that plaintiffs personal experiences in a written brief,
in an oral argument, or in front of a jury will, therefore, succeed in provoking
thought and laying a stronger foundation upon which to build her legal argu-
ments.
Unfortunately, the drawback to finding a plaintiff who represents the
"right" kind of story and who has the ability to connect with people and open
minds is that this strategy necessarily excludes people who do not fit perfectly
into that mold, or who would not want to fit perfectly even if they could.
Framed against the backdrop of a monogamous, family-oriented couple, it might
indeed be easier for a court to conclude that excluding gay men from the donor
pool is discriminatory. Many gay men (and women), however, reject monog-
amy and traditional notions of family as forced assimilation into the heterosex-
ual hegemony. 39 Truthfully, the very concept of the "perfect plaintiff' is a con-
servative proposal; it accepts and uses the status quo as a legitimate point of
comparison. But while alternative counter-stories can raise consciousness and
show "that there are possibilities for life other than the ones we live,' , it is of-
ten harder for minority groups to dismantle the status quo without first earning
the credibility that comes from the very assimilation they wish to fight against.
In a purely practical, litigation-oriented sense, it is more difficult to un-
dermine a policy designed to prevent the spread of sexually transmitted diseases
if the plaintiff is a sexually active, un-partnered gay male who wants to donate
sperm, even if he always practices safe sex. Society has stigmatized this male
prototype, and it distrusts his lifestyle and questions his health. Hopefully this
will soon become an outdated conception as gays and MSMs advance in the
realm of legal rights and are able to tell every story. Until then, there is little
choice but to accommodate bias. For the purposes of this Note, and more im-
portantly, for litigation, the focus will be on the "perfect" hypothetical plaintiff.
He exhibits many of the qualities with which a judge or jury may be sympa-
thetic and relate. His story, which discusses how he met his partner, is intended
35 Id. at 2279.
36 HAYMAN, supra note 33, at 464.
37 Richard Delgado, Storytelling: Re-Imagining Law Through Literature, in JURISPRUDENCE
CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY: FROM NATURAL LAW TO POSTMODERNISM 503, 504 (2d ed.
2002).
38 Id.
39 See G.W. Dowsett, I'll Show You Mine if You'll Show Me Yours: Gay Men, Masculinity
Research, Men's Studies, and Sex, 22 THEORY & SOCIETY 697, 699 (1993).
40 Delgado, supra note 37.
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to remind those in relationships of their own courtship. And the life he ulti-
mately builds with his partner embodies the popular values of family, commit-
ment, monogamy, community involvement, and financial responsibility. It is
important to tell his and others' stories because they add faces to victims. A
court or jury will find it more difficult to ignore the effects that the FDA's dis-
criminatory policy has on real people if those effects are presented through the
use of a story and characters which represent lives not much different from their
own.
41
In 1995, during the spring semester of their junior years, mere chance
brought Aaron and Josh together when a Professor assigned them to the same
study group.42 Groups had always made Aaron a little bit nervous, but he re-
signed himself to participate when necessary and stay quiet if at all possible.
During the group's second official meeting, the self-appointed leader asked eve-
ryone to divide into partners and put together an outline. Aaron secretly hated
partner work, mainly because he was always one of the last people still looking
to pair up. He scanned the room, took a deep breath, and introduced himself to
Josh-the only remaining partner-less person in the room.
Surprisingly, and to Aaron's relief, the two hit it off right away and
hardly noticed the hours creep by as they worked together on the outline that
night. They made so much progress, in fact, that they agreed to meet several
more times that week to get a head start on studying for the midterm. Aaron
loved that he and Josh had so much in common, and he felt like their low-key
personalities really clicked. Over the course of the semester, they began to
spend time together outside of class, and quickly became good friends. Before
they knew it, it was time for finals and the semester was almost over. At lunch
one day, Josh mentioned that he was looking for a new place to live for the up-
coming year, and he asked Aaron if he was interested in being his roommate.
Aaron, eager to finally live off campus, enthusiastically accepted Josh's offer.
When fall finally came, Aaron and Josh moved into their apartment and
became even closer friends. They took classes together, developed a core social
group, and even occasionally spent time with each other's families on the week-
ends. They had grown so close, in fact, that their friends began to comment on
their relationship, and teased them about acting like "a couple." And it didn't
end there. The "gay jokes" soon became a staple at social events. Aaron tried
to laugh along with his friends, but secretly, he was struggling. He wanted to
41 But there is also the risk that even the "perfect plaintiff' may not successfully connect with
a jury; despite obvious parallels to a "traditional" family unit, jurors may be blocked by, or be
unsympathetic to, the struggle for sexual identity realization. Sadly, this is a potential barrier in
any case in which there is discrimination based on norm-defying sexuality.
42 Aaron and Josh are fictional characters, but many of the events described are based loosely
on the lives of a real couple.
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pass it all off as harmless joking, but he couldn't help but wonder whether there
was some truth behind his friends' teasing. And if so, why did that bother him
so much? Aaron was hopelessly confused. He knew that his feelings for Josh
were strong-perhaps even unusually strong-but he had never seriously con-
sidered that he might be gay. Sure, he had questioned himself a few times. But
it had never amounted to anything more than just that. Still, Aaron worried
about whether something was different this time, and he wondered what was
going through Josh's mind. After weeks of waging an internal battle, he de-
cided that the only way to make sense of his situation was to be honest with
Josh. And he was. Soon, the two friends found themselves talking to each other
about things that neither had ever imagined he would say out loud. It came as a
huge relief.
Aaron and Josh have now been together for twelve years. While
Aaron's life with Josh was an unexpected turn, he has absolutely no regrets. He
was finally honest with himself, and now, for the first time in his life, he is truly
happy. Although their relationship is technically nontraditional, Aaron sees it
no differently than any other: while together, neither he nor Josh has expressed
interest in pursuing outside sexual relationships, and each has fully committed
himself to monogamy; in 1999, they made it "official" by exchanging rings in a
small ceremony with their family and friends; in 2001, they had finally saved up
enough money to buy a house together; and just two years ago, they adopted
their first son. Everyone who knows them describes the two as "the perfect
couple."
Six months ago, Aaron read an article in the paper concerning the short-
age of black sperm donors.4 3 The article noted that "[b]lack couples looking for
same-race sperm donors have a very limited number of options when choosing
donors, '"44 and it attributed the lack of donors to the small number of black men
who are graduates of a four-year college or university. 45 As a black man who
had ultimately earned a master's degree, Aaron hoped that he would qualify. He
made an appointment with a local fertility clinic and felt good about his decision
to do what he could to help other families in need.46
During his screening interview, Aaron was asked a series of questions,
all of which he answered with no trouble; he was in good health and had never
engaged in what he considered "risky behaviors." He answered "no" to every
43 See Sperm Donors from America's Most Selective Universities: Limited Choices for Black
Women, 25 J. BLACKS & HIGHER EDUC. 38 (1999). "At the nation's largest sperm banks, black
donors are so few that black couples have almost no options in choosing donors with specific
educational backgrounds, talents, or achievements." Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 The principle purpose of sperm banks is to help infertile couples conceive a child, and do-
nating sperm is socially encouraged and applauded. Sperm donation is comparable to blood dona-
tion in that both acts help people in need. See Anne Reichman Schiff, Frustrated Intentions and
Binding Biology: Seeking Aid in the Law, 44 DuKE L. J. 524, 562-63 (1994).
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question as the nurse read down the check-list: he did not have hemophilia, he
never injected drugs intravenously, he had never engaged in sex in exchange for
money, and he had never been incarcerated.47 The nurse seemed satisfied with
his answers, but then asked one final question: "Have you engaged in sex with
another man in the past five years?" Aaron grew mildly embarrassed, but an-
swered honestly with a simple "yes." The nurse made a few notes, looked
grimly at Aaron, paused, and then said, "I'm sorry, sir. You are not qualified to
donate semen at this time because engaging in sexual activities with another
male increases the risk that you are a carrier of a relevant communicable dis-
ease." Aaron sat stunned and motionless in his chair as the nurse politely ex-
cused herself.
Although Aaron is in a long-term, monogamous relationship, he is con-
sidered more likely to have HIV or AIDS because that relationship is with an-
other man rather than a woman. Put simply, Aaron cannot donate sperm be-
cause he is gay. While both Aaron and his story are largely fictional, they illus-
trate the reality that many gay men in America face today. The story represents
a lifestyle that the FDA and most sperm banks ignored when they implemented
their policies. It paints a picture that is contrary to a common perception of gay
life: a perception that identifies gays, and gay men specifically, as promiscuous
and uninvolved in family matters. It also shows that many gay men are just like
anyone else-or, more to the point, just like judges and jurors. For these rea-
sons, the "perfect plaintiff' and his story are highly relevant from a litigation
perspective.
IV. CLAIM AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: THE FDA'S
RECOMMENDATION IS AN UNLAWFUL AGENCY ACTION
In 2007, the FDA solidified its stance on gay sperm donors as a "risk
factor" when it issued its final guidance document recommending that men who
have had sex with another man in the past five years be ineligible.48 The FDA
emphasized that its proposed eligibility guidelines are not binding, do not "es-
tablish legally enforceable responsibilities," and do not "create or confer any
rights for or on any person;" the guidelines merely describe its "current thinking
on a topic and should be viewed only as recommendations. ' 49 In its final rule,
however, the FDA requires that persons who interview potential donors screen
for "risk factors., 50 Notably, the FDA neglects to identify those factors in its
47 See Final Guidance Document, supra note 3, at 14-20. These questions represent four of the
twenty-nine conditions and behaviors that the FDA considers risk factors. Id.
48 Final Guidance Document, supra note 3, at 14.
49 Id. at 1.
50 21 C.F.R. § 1271.75(a)(1) (2007).
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regulation. 5' The only criteria that artificial reproductive facilities are given
about which risks they must screen for in order to comply with the law, there-
fore, come from the FDA's "nonbinding" guidance document.52
In 1946, Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) as
the code of rulemaking and adjudicative procedures applicable to federal agen-
cies.53 The APA establishes an independent cause of action for parties injured
by unlawful agency regulations.m The statute provides that "[a] person suffer-
ing legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial
review thereof., 55 Once a court finds that the agency's action is final, it may
then consider six factors to determine whether that action is unlawful: (1) is it
arbitrary or capricious, (2) is it unconstitutional, (3) is it outside of the agency's
jurisdiction, (4) did the agency fail to follow statutory procedures, (5) is it un-
supported by substantial evidence, or (6) is it unwarranted by the facts?
5 6
Thus, when determining whether to challenge the FDA's guidance
document as an unlawful agency action, there are several things to consider.
Before evaluating the merits of the claim, one must determine whether the
FDA's recommendation constitutes final agency action. But how do we know?
Does the FDA escape judicial review of its recommendations because it did not
officially codify them in its final rule concerning donor eligibility? Is the gay
man or MSM who is turned away at the sperm bank left without recourse?
Next, if the FDA's guidance document is in fact final agency action, which of
the APA's six factors for determining unlawfulness will a court consider? Do
any of these factors suggest that the FDA's action is unlawful? The Note will
now attempt to navigate through these issues and examine each in turn.
A. The FDA's Recommendation May be Considered Final Agency Action
Subject to Judicial Review
In Franklin v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court provided helpful in-
sight into what constitutes final agency action.57 Quoting one of its earlier deci-
sions, the Court stated that "[t]o determine when an agency action is final, we
51 Preamble, supra note 1, at 29,805-06 (stating that it specifically described risk factors in a
guidance document, but would not specify those factors in the final rule).
52 Id. at 29,786. Further, the FDA specifically rejects the proposition that establishments
should be able to screen on HIV test results alone because "even that testing may fail to detect
early stage IV and other infections .. " Id. at 29,806.
53 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 702-04 (West 2007).
54 Id. at § 702.
55 Id.
56 5 U.S.C. § 706.
57 See generally 505 U.S. 788 (1992) (finding that the Secretary of Commerce's report to the
President on the U.S. census and its effects on state Representative apportionment was not final
action under the APA).
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have looked to, among other things, whether its impact 'is sufficiently direct and
immediate' and has a 'direct effect on . . . day-to-day business.'s '58 The Court
reasoned that the action is not final if it is only "tentative," and stressed that
"[t]he core question is whether the agency has completed its decisionmaking
process, and whether the result of that process is one that will directly affect the
parties. 59
Building on the Supreme Court's precedent, another court took the "fi-
nal action" analysis even further.6° In PDK Labs Inc. v. Ashcroft, the Drug En-
forcement Administration (DEA) counseled an ephedrine supplier to forgo sell-
ing its product to a pharmaceutical company (PDK) that used ephedrine to make
over-the-counter drugs.61 The DEA claimed that it had not engaged in final
agency action because it had merely offered advice on a hypothetical course of
action.62 The court rejected this argument, reasoning that "'[f]inality' must be
interpreted in a flexible and pragmatic way," and that an agency's characteriza-
tion of its own actions is not determinative.63 Otherwise, an agency's ruling
could escape judicial review simply because the agency refuses to acknowledge
its finality.64
The label an agency attaches to its actions is not determinative.
The action may be reviewable even thought [sic] it is merely an
announcement of a rule or policy that the agency has not yet put
into effect. Indeed, agency action may be reviewable even
though it is never to have any formal, legal effect.65
Ultimately, the court held that the DEA had engaged in final action. 66 It
stated that the DEA knowingly discouraged the business transaction because its
statements undoubtedly communicated its desire for the supplier to refrain from
selling ephedrine to PDK.67 The court found that the "direct and immediate
result" was that the DEA had threatened PDK's business because it could not
purchase the materials necessary to make its product.
68
58 Id. at 796-97 (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152 (1967)).
59 Id. at 797.
60 See generally PDK Labs Inc. v. Ashcroft, 338 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2004).
61 See id. at 3, 5.
62 Id. at 10 (citing Franklin, 505 U.S. at 797).
63 Id.
64 Id. at 11.
65 Id. at 10-11 (citing N.Y. Stock Exch. v. Bloom, 562 F.2d 736, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (empha-
sis added).
66 Id. at 12.
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Recently, agencies have bypassed traditional notice-and-comment rule-
making procedures at an increasing rate, and have instead opted to release guid-
ance documents similar to the FDA's at issue here.69 Due to this trend, several
courts have had the opportunity to examine whether such guidance or advisory
documents constitute final agency action subject to judicial review. Perhaps
the case that is most closely on point is Appalachian Power v. EPA.71 There, the
EPA issued a guidance document that allegedly imposed unauthorized require-
ments on states' permit programs under the Clean Air Act.72 The EPA's guid-
ance document required "[p]eriodic monitoring... at a source subject to title V
of the Act . . ,,73 The document was not the product of notice-and-comment
rulemaking, nor was it published in the Federal Register; the EPA, therefore,
insisted that the document was not binding or final, and was not subject to judi-
cial review.74 In holding that the EPA's guidance document was, in fact, final
agency action, the court stated, "the entire Guidance, from beginning to end...
reads like a ukase [edict]. It commands, it requires, it orders, it dictates.
Through the Guidance, EPA has given the States their 'marching orders' and
EPA expects the States to fall in line.,
7 5
Of course, these opinions represent only a fraction of the cases that have
dealt with what constitutes final agency action, and other courts have formulated
additional tests for determining whether action is final. In sum, courts may ap-
ply one of the following four tests when determining whether informal agency
action is "final action": (1) does it have a direct and immediate impact on regu-
lated industries, (2) do regulated parties rely on the action, (3) has the agency
expressed its final, crystallized position on the matter, or (4) is a high-level offi-
cial directly responsible for the action?
76
69 PETER L. STRAUSS, TODD. D. RAKOFF & CYNTHIA R. FARINA, GELLHORN AND BYSE'S
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 1248 (rev. 10th ed. 2003).
70 See generally, e.g., Nat'l Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (finding an agency head's advisory opinion to be final agency action because he
did not indicate that it was tentative and subject to reconsideration); Appalachian Power v. EPA,
208 F.3d 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding the guidance document final agency action because it
"dictates" to states a course of action and expects them to comply).
71 208 F.3d 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
72 Id. at 1019.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 1020-21. Similar to the disclaimer in the FDA's guidance document referenced supra
note 49, the EPA's guidance document included the following language: "The policies set forth in
this paper are intended solely as guidance, do not represent final Agency action, and cannot be
relied upon to create any rights enforceable by any party." Id. at 1023. The court noted, however,
that the language was of little consequence because the EPA consistently includes the disclaimer
in all of its documents. Id.
75 Id. at 1023.
76 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 462 (West 2007) (finding that no specific provision of
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In light of the case law and the widely acknowledged "final action"
tests, the FDA's informal guidance document likely constitutes final agency
action. First, the FDA's recommendations have a direct and immediate impact
on the artificial reproduction industry, and second, the industry relies on those
recommendations. Because the law requires sperm banks to screen donors for
risk factors, many establishments will look to the FDA's guidance document to
determine what those risk factors are. The FDA is undoubtedly aware that this
is the likely result. Otherwise, expending the resources necessary to issue both
draft and final guidance documents would have been frivolous. When sperm
banks and clinics find that the FDA has "offered advice" on the relevant screen-
ing factors (much like the DEA "offered advice" in PDK Labs), and recom-
mends that men who have had sex with men in the past five years be ineligible
to donate, many will implement the recommendation into their own eligibility
requirements. 77 As an indication of the persuasive power of guidance docu-
ments, Hugh M. O'Neil, Vice President of the pharmaceutical company Sanofi-
Aventis, recently commented that, while agencies' guidance documents do not
have the force of law, they "can have coercive effects" and "can impose signifi-
cant costs" on the public.78 Thus, because many in the industry will be per-
suaded by, and will rely on, the FDA's guidance document, the direct and im-
mediate impact on the artificial reproduction industry is two-fold: (1) the indus-
try will see widespread implementation of the FDA's recommendation, and (2)
the industry will necessarily receive fewer sperm donations.
Third, the FDA has expressed its finalized view on the matter. Within
the very guidance document, the FDA states that the provisions therein repre-
sent its "current thinking" on this topic, 79 and in the preamble to its final rule,
the FDA states that it finds no new data that would warrant revising its previous
guidelines. 80 Because the FDA has remained steadfast and unwavering in "its
current belief' that men who have had sex with men within a five-year window
should be ineligible to donate sperm, the facts strongly indicate that the action
represents its final and crystallized position.
The fourth enumerated test-whether a high-ranking officer has direct
responsibility for the action-is probably inapplicable in this situation because
the guidance document is a collective work meant to represent the FDA as a
singular entity. Regardless, it is only necessary to meet one of the four tests to
77 Unfortunately, research did not yield the number of establishments that changed their eligi-
bility requirements following the FDA's draft and final guidance documents. Further investiga-
tion into this statistic is needed.
78 Robert Pear, Bush Directive Increases Sway on Regulation, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 30, 2007, at
Al.
79 Final Guidance Document, supra note 3, at 1.
80 Preamble, supra note 1, at 29,806. The FDA concedes that new data may justify changes to
its guidance, and promises to "continue to examine the data on risk factors." Id. But one could
argue that this statement is too open-ended and vague to warrant a finding that the FDA's guid-
ance document does not represent a "final, crystallized position on the matter."
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find that an informal agency action represents the requisite final action neces-
sary for judicial review.8' Here, there is a strong argument that the guidance
document satisfies at least three of the four tests. Although the FDA pointedly
emphasizes that the recommendations "do not establish legally enforceable re-
sponsibilities" and "do[] not operate to bind the FDA or the public," PDK Labs
reminds us that the label an agency attaches to its own actions is not dispositive,
and that even actions never intended to have a legal effect can be final.82
B. The FDA's Recommendation May be Unlawful if it is Arbitrary, Capri-
cious, or an Abuse of Discretion
If the FDA's recommendation is indeed a final agency action subject to
judicial review, the next step is to determine the scope of that review. The
scope of judicial review will depend upon whether the recommendation came
about as part of formal 83 or informal84 agency rulemaking.85 In light of the dis-
tinct differences between formal and informal agency actions, the rulemaking at
issue here is clearly informal; rather than engaging in the court-like proceedings
required of formal rulemaking or adjudication,86 the FDA issued notice that it
was promulgating a rule concerning donor eligibility requirements and then
solicited comments regarding its draft guidance document. 87 The FDA's guid-
ance document, thus, appears to fall within the framework of informal rulemak-
ing.88 While the APA outlines six potential criteria that shall render an agency's
formal rulemaking unlawful,89 the court's review of informal agency action is
more limited.90 Thus, the court will determine (1) whether the agency had the
81 See supra note 76 (stating that "[i]nformal agency action may be final agency action...
when one or more of the following elements is present.") (emphasis added).
82 PDK Labs Inc. v. Ashcroft, 338 F.Supp.2d 1, 10-11 (D.D.C. 2004).
83 5 U.S.C.A. § 553, 556-57 (West 2007).
84 Id. at § 553(c).
85 See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
86 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 556-57 (requiring a formal hearing).
87 Preamble, supra note 1, at 29,787. ("We are now making final the donor-suitability pro-
posed rule that was proposed on September 30, 1999.... The comment period for that proposed
rule was closed on December 29, 1999."). See also FDA Finalizes New Rule, supra note 2
("Comments on the draft guidance should be received by August 23, 2004 (90 days from the
publication date) to assure consideration in the final guidance.").
88 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 159 (West 2007) ("In the case of informal rulemaking
under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, an agency must give interested persons an oppor-
tunity to participate in the rule-making process through submission of written data, views, or
arguments with or without the opportunity for an oral presentation.").
89 5 U.S.C.A. § 706 (West 2007).
90 See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414-15 (1971) (stating that
"[r]eview under the substantial-evidence test is authorized only when the agency action is taken
pursuant to a rulemaking provision of the Administrative Procedure Act itself ... " and that de
novo review of whether the action was "unwarranted by the facts" is authorized only when the
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authority, (2) whether it complied with the proscribed procedures, and (3)
whether its action was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 91 Al-
though it is possible to argue that the recommendation is unlawful under the first
two factors, and indeed those claims may prove very effective, analyses of those
arguments are beyond the scope of this Note.92 Instead, the Note will focus on
the claim that the recommendation is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discre-
tion.93
In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,94 the Supreme Court
considered whether the Secretary of Transportation's authorization of federal
funds to finance the construction of a highway was an unlawful action under the
action is adjudicatory in nature); CF&I Steel Corp. v. Econ. Dev. Admin., 624 F.2d 136, 139 (10th
Cir. 1980) (finding that "[n]either the substantial evidence test nor de novo review apply to infor-
mal agency action"); Anderson v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 701 F.2d 112, 113 (10th
Cir. 1983) (finding that the function of judicial review is to determine agency authority, whether
the agency complied with procedures, and whether the agency's action is arbitrary, capricious, or
an abuse of discretion). But cf. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 540 F.2d 1023, 1028
(10th Cir. 1976) (stating that "[plerhaps agency action which is not based on substantial evidence
is arbitrary and capricious") (emphasis added).
91 Anderson, 701 F.2d at 113.
92 There may be a viable argument that the FDA does not have the authority to take this infor-
mal action, or that the FDA took the informal action without following the proscribed procedures.
These arguments are, however, difficult to make. Because the FDA's enabling statute gives it the
authority to regulate the public safety and health, and because the goal of the FDA's guidance
document is to assist the industry in protecting the public safety and health, it is likely that the
FDA has the authority to make this kind of recommendation in a guidance document. See Food,
Drug, and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-99 (West 2007).
If a court finds that the guidance document is final agency action, it is less certain, however,
whether the FDA complied with the procedures required by the APA. Because the FDA solicited
comments on its draft guidance document prior to releasing the final version, it has the superficial
appearance of informal rulemaking. But here, unlike in typical informal rulemaking, the FDA
explicitly decries the legally binding nature of the document. Depending on whether the guidance
document indeed constitutes final agency action with legal implications, the relevant inquiry may
become whether the FDA complied with the required informal rulemaking procedures. This
analysis is beyond the scope of this Note. An attorney who litigates this case may find it advanta-
geous to probe deeper into these questions.
93 For a more complete articulation of the appropriate level of judicial inquiry in determining
whether agency action is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, see, e.g., Transactive
Corp. v. United States, 91 F.3d 232, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating that "agency action is arbitrary
when the agency offered insufficient reasons for treating similar situations differently"); Patterson
v. Caterpillar, Inc., 70 F.3d 503, 505 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that "[blefore concluding that a deci-
sion was arbitrary and capricious, a court must be very confident that the decisionmaker over-
looked something important or seriously erred in appreciating the significance of the evidence");
Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d
677, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding that the APA's "substantial evidence" and "arbitrary, capri-
cious, or abuse of discretion" provisions require the same quantum of factual support).
94 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
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APA.95 The Court concluded that although the Secretary is not required to in-
clude formal findings with his decision, the decision cannot be arbitrary, capri-
cious, or an abuse of discretion under the APA.9 6 In analyzing the decision's
lawfulness, the Court stated:
[Courts] must consider whether the decision was based on a
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been
a clear error of judgment. Although this inquiry into the facts is
to be searching and careful.... [t]he court is not empowered to
substitute its judgment for that of the agency.
97
Essentially, the Supreme Court confirmed that administrative decision-
making is reviewable under something akin to a rational basis test, and that
agency action will be found valid provided that it is not wholly irrational.98
While this test affords great deference to agencies' informal actions, it is
not entirely without bite. In Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm,99 the
Supreme Court held that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's
(NHTSA) rescission of its regulation requiring all new automobiles to come
equipped with passive restraints (automatic seatbelts or airbags) was arbitrary
and capricious. 1°° The NHTSA rescinded the requirement because the automo-
bile industry had overwhelmingly decided to install detachable seatbelts in most
cars.101 Because passengers could easily remove their seatbelts, the NHTSA
concluded that the regulation was no longer reasonable or practical.102 In its
opinion, the Supreme Court shed significant light on this "wholly irrational" test
as applied to "arbitrary and capricious" agency action. The Court stated:
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if
the agency has ... entirely failed to consider an important as-
pect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that
95 Id. Under federal law, the Secretary can only approve such financing if they determine that
there is no feasible and alternative route. In this case, the Secretary approved the route without
providing a statement that detailed his factual findings. Id. at 402, 408.
96 Id. at 409, 416.
97 Id. at 416 (internal citations omitted). The Court ultimately remanded the case for further
fact-finding. It advised the lower court to avoid inquiring into decision-makers' mental processes
when their decisions are accompanied by formal findings: such an inquiry is warranted only when
there is a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior. Id. at 420.
98 See Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARv. L. REV. 505, 532
(1985) (finding that courts afford agencies' findings of fact great deference under the minimum
rationality or rational basis test).
99 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
lOO Id. at 46.
101 Id. at 38.
102 Id. at 38-39.
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runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implau-
sible that it could not be ascribed ... to the product of agency
expertise.
10 3
The Court ultimately concluded that the rescission was arbitrary and ca-
pricious because the NHTSA did not consider revising its standards to require
airbags in light of the automobile industry's adoption of detachable seatbelts,1
4
and because the NHTSA irrationally dismissed the safety benefits of detachable
seatbelts. 10 5 The Court recognized that available data will not always satisfy a
regulatory issue, and that agencies often exercise judgment to reach a policy
decision. 1°6 But it also noted that "the agency must explain the evidence which
is available, and must offer a 'rational connection between the facts found and
the choice made."1 0 7
C. The FDA's Recommendation to Exclude MSM Donations is Arbitrary,
Capricious, and an Abuse of Discretion Because it is not Rationally
Based on the Facts
In response to the FDA's call for comments, Lambda Legal sent a letter
to the agency in which it stressed that the exclusion of MSM donors is "unnec-
essary," "ill-conceived," and has no "legitimate scientific rationale."'' 0 8 The
letter first argues that the five-year exclusionary period is excessive, citing mul-
tiple sources that show that the average person develops detectable antibodies
two to three months after infection; only in extremely rare cases can it take six
to twelve months to detect antibodies.' °9 The letter further emphasizes the dis-
parity by highlighting the availability of nucleic acid amplified testing (NAT)
which "reduces the window between exposure and detection to a matter of days
or weeks."' 10 In fact, the guidance document specifically recommends that
sperm donors "be tested with FDA-licensed NAT blood donor screening tests
for HIV and HCV." '' I Moreover, the rate of error (false negatives) in testing is
103 Id. at 43.
104 Id. at 46. Before the Court of Appeals, the agency noted several difficulties involved in a
mandatory airbag system, including the hardships involved in installing airbags in small vehicles
and the adverse public reaction. The Supreme Court, however, rejected these post hoc arguments
because the agency had never discussed the possibility of a mandatory airbag system, and, there-
fore, did not submit formal fact-finding. Id. at 49-50.
105 Id. at 51.
106 Id. at 52.
107 Id. (citing Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
108 Givner, supra note 27, at 1, 1-2.
109 Id. at 3 & n.1.
110 Id. at 3-4 & n.4.
Ill Id. at 4; Draft Guidance Document, supra note 3, at 31.
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.05 percent, and double testing reduces the risk to almost zero.1 2 The data illus-
trates the glaring incongruity between the five-year exclusionary period and the
actual risk, especially in light of the FDA's mandatory six-month specimen
quarantine and dual blood test requirements.
Next, the letter highlights the FDA's arbitrary distinctions between
various risk factors, and the disparate impact that these distinctions have on gay
men. The letter notes, for instance, that the five-year exclusion is "particularly
questionable" when compared to the one-year waiting period recommended for
any donor who "has had sex with someone he knows or suspects to be infected
with HIV, HBV, or HCV," or any donor who has undergone tattooing or pierc-
ing with a shared instrument.113 It also notes that any person who fails to use a
condom during sexual activity increases the risk of disease transmission by
twenty percent, and asserts that eligibility should be determined based on indi-
vidual risk factors rather than on sexual orientation. 14
The letter from Lambda Legal is just one source of factual data that the
FDA has received regarding its recommendation against MSM donor eligibil-
ity. 115 In the preamble to its final rule, the FDA acknowledges that it has "re-
ceived many comments opposed to a screening factor that would prevent men
who have had sex with men from donating semen anonymously."'1 6 Con-
versely, the FDA reports that it received only one comment that warned against
imperfect HIV antibody testing."17 Still, the FDA disputes the ability of NAT
testing to detect early stage infections (although it specifically recommends such
testing in the guidance document), and refuses to acknowledge any new data
that warrants a change in its policy against MSM donor eligibility.
1 8
Although courts are required to afford informal agency action a high
degree of deference, that deference is not a rubber stamp. This is a case where
the facts do not rationally lead to the FDA's action, and, in fact, show that the
FDA action is "wholly irrational."' 1 9 First, applying the standard set in Volpe, a
searching and careful inquiry into the facts reveals that the five-year exclusion-
ary period is facially irrational. The FDA does not adequately explain in its
guidance document or preamble why it might take five years to detect infection
in gay men but only one year to detect infection in other potential donors.
120
112 Givner, supra note 27, at 4-5 & nn.5, 7.
113 Id. at 5; Draft Guidance Document, supra note 3, at 16-17.
114 Givner, supra note 27, at 6 & n.9.
115 While the FDA does not publish all of its received comments, the comments are public
documents available for review pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act.
116 Preamble, supra note 1, at 29,805.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 29,806.
119 See Garland, supra note 98, at 532.
120 See Culhane, supra note 25, at 139, 141 (finding that the FDA cites a 1983 and two 1985
sources in support of the five-year exclusion, all of which are based on outdated science from
before the time of HIV-antibody testing). The FDA also cites a 1988 CDC document that stresses
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Rather, the data before the FDA indicated that in only the most extreme cases do
antibodies manifest later than six months following transmission. This is true
regardless of sexual orientation or sexual practice. Similarly, the FDA stresses
that all testing is prone to error, human and otherwise, but has not provided facts
that support the proposition that the rate of error diminishes after a year in some
groups but not others. Thus, the FDA's five-year exclusionary period for
MSMs treats similar situations differently, 12 1 and it is "wholly irrational" in light
of the FDA's interest in protecting public health. "Under these rules, a hetero-
sexual man who had unprotected sex with HIV-positive [female] prostitutes
would be OK as a donor one year later, but a gay man in a monogamous, safe-
sex relationship is not ....
The distinction between MSMs and men who have sex with women,
without more, is not rationally related to the prevention of disease transmission.
In Motor Vehicles, the court reasoned that agency actions are irrational if the
agency fails to consider an important aspect of the problem.123 In this case, an
important aspect of the problem is unquestionably the growing number of new
HIV transmissions resulting from heterosexual sexual activity. In fact, as previ-
ously discussed, the CDC recently found that the majority of new RIV transmis-
sions worldwide result from heterosexual activity, and that these transmissions
account for thirty-five percent of all transmissions in the United States. 124 This
data is readily available to both the public and to the FDA. The FDA also ac-
knowledges in its preamble that it has received numerous comments suggesting
that there is no basis for singling out MSMs as a risk factor, and that to do so is
discriminatory. 25 Because the FDA focuses on the sex of the parties engaged in
sexual acts rather than the unsafe nature of any sexual act performed by any
sexually active person, it ignores the reality of disease transmission. Accord-
ingly, under Motor Vehicles, the FDA's failure to consider this important health
aspect renders its action arbitrary and capricious.
These are merely two points which highlight the irrationality of the
MSM exclusionary recommendation, but there are certainly others. For in-
stance, why does the FDA ignore the evidence that double testing practically
eliminates the risk of error? And why does the FDA fail to mention that there
has not been a single case of HIV transmission from frozen, quarantined sperm
the importance of freezing the sperm, but this document refers to the 1985 reports when it dis-
cusses risk factors. Id. at 141.
121 See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing a decision in which the court held that
agency action was arbitrary and capricious because it treated similar scenarios differently without
justification).
122 David Crary, Despite Objections, FDA Set to Implement New Rules Rejecting Gay Men as
Anonymous Sperm Donors, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 5, 2005, available at LEXIS. See generally
Final Guidance Document, supra note 3.
123 Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
124 Heterosexual Transmissions, supra note 28.
125 Preamble, supra note 1, at 29,805.
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to a recipient? 26 In light of the relevant facts, there is a convincing argument to
be made that the five-year exclusionary period and emphasis on gay acts is
based not on scientific evidence, but perhaps on the majority's desire to sup-
press a subgroup based on prejudice. While a court will recognize that the
FDA's judgment is generally due great deference, an analysis of the data readily
available to the FDA will prove that there has been a clear error in judgment,
and that this particular policy is inconsistent, irrational, and the very definition
of arbitrary and capricious.
V. CLAIMS AGAINST PRIVATE SPERM BANKS, CLINICS, AND OTHER
ESTABLISHMENTS THAT SCREEN OUT MSM DONORS
Perhaps another way to end stigmatization and seek equality for gay
men and MSMs is to take a more direct approach: file suit against the entities
that affirmatively embrace the discriminatory "no gays allowed" policy. After
all, not all of these institutions waited for the FDA to formally take a stance
before rejecting MSM donors. 127 In fact, some have been excluding MSMs for
well over a decade. 128 Bob Rigney, Chief Executive Officer of the American
Association of Tissue Banks, predicted that the FDA's recommendation would
have a limited effect on the industry because many tissue banks already "ex-
clude[d] active homosexuals from anonymous sperm donations. ' 29  Conse-
quently, the impact that these establishments have had on gay men has been
even more prolonged and damaging.
There are several legal theories under which an attorney can bring a
claim against an individual sperm bank or clinic. For the purposes of this Note,
however, the focus is on some of the theories available under the U.S. Constitu-
tion and various state constitutions. The Note will now examine some of the
rights and protections afforded by these constitutions, and it will discuss how a
reproductive facility's exclusionary policy may be unconstitutional under each.
It will also highlight the weaknesses and strengths of these arguments, as well as
the advantages and disadvantages of bringing particular claims.
126 See Culhane, supra note 25, at 140 (finding that of the four reported HIV transmissions
from organ donors to recipients, none occurred within the context of the frozen sperm and six-
month quarantine rules).
127 Rona Marech, FDA Sperm Donation Rule Upsets Gay Rights Groups, SAN FRANcIsco
CHRON., May 6, 2005, at B3.
128 Valerie Richardson, Gays Barred from Sperm Banks; Rights Groups Say FDA Rule 'Based
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A. Claims Under the U.S. Constitution
1. Is There State Action?
While a party is free to bring constitutional claims against public sperm
banks, clinics, or hospitals that screen out MSM donors, he faces some difficulty
when that entity is private because the individual rights and liberties afforded by
the Constitution apply only to federal and state governmental action. 130 If one
intends to challenge the constitutionality of private action, he must, therefore,
show that the defendant's actions constitute governmental or "state" action, and
that an appropriate constitutional provision regulates that action. 131 Essentially,
the Supreme Court has found private action to be governmental action for con-
stitutional purposes when it is "fairly attributable to the state."
' 132
The Supreme Court has historically found state action in three distinct
circumstances and, debatably, it now recognizes a fourth. The situations in
which private action may constitute state action are as follows: (1) when the
entity engages in traditionally public functions, (2) when the state commands or
encourages the private activity, (3) when there are sufficient mutual contacts
between the government and the private entity, and arguably, (4) when there is
significant government entwinement with the private entity. 133 In preparing for
a potential suit against a private sperm bank or clinic, one must first decide
which, if any, of the four state action doctrines are applicable. It is relatively
safe to rule out the "public functions" doctrine as a potential route. This theory
requires the private entity to engage in functions that the government has tradi-
tionally and almost exclusively operated.1 34 In this case, the majority of estab-
lishments that collect human tissue and cellular donations are privately operated.
Although the first of the four state action doctrines is likely inapplicable here,
the Note will now analyze the likelihood that the private discrimination amounts
to state action under each of the three remaining tests. To be sure, establishing
"state action" will be no easy task.
130 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE
AND PROCEDURE, 758 (3d ed. 1999).
131 Id. at 758-59.
132 Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
133 See ROTUNDA, supra note 130, at § 16; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rhetoric of Con-
stitutional Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2008, 2024 (2002).
134 ROTUNDA, supra note 130, at 771; see Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353
(1974) (finding that because Pennsylvania did not have a duty to provide utility services, private
utility company did not engage in a public function).
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a. Does the State Encourage the Private Sperm Bank's
Activities?
First, one can attempt to argue that the FDA encourages or coerces pri-
vate clinics to discriminate against gay men. The Supreme Court has ruled that
"[a] State can normally be held responsible for a private decision only when it
has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement,
either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the
state." 135 In San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. U.S. Olympic Committee,136 the
Supreme Court applied the "encouragement" doctrine to a federal statute that
granted the USOC, a private entity, certain commercial rights to the word
"Olympic."1 37 The statute stipulated that violators "shall be subject to suit in a
civil action" brought by the USOC. 138 Pursuant to the federal statute, the USOC
sued the SFAA, a nonprofit organization, because it used the word "Olympic" in
its sponsored event. 139 The SFAA countered, arguing that the USOC violated
the Fifth Amendment by discriminating in its enforcement of the right. 140 The
Court found that that the USOC had not engaged in state action, and was
thereby not subject to Constitutional provisions because there was no evidence
that the government had coerced or encouraged it to exercise its rights in any
particular manner.1 41 The court reasoned that Congress did not encourage the
USOC to enforce its exclusive rights to the word "Olympic" through a lawsuit,
but merely stipulated in the statute that the option was available.
Here, however, an attorney can feasibly argue that the FDA directly en-
couraged and coerced private sperm banks and clinics to screen out MSMs.
Unlike in U.S. Olympic Committee, where the government did not require the
USOC to file suit to enforce its rights, the FDA mandates that all establishments
must screen for risk factors. 142 While it has not codified specific risk factors, the
logical conclusion is that its guidance document will effectively encourage and
coerce the regulated industry to adopt MSM status as a risk factor. One sperm
bank director has even expressed fear that the FDA could shut down an estab-
lishment that does not adopt the recommendations.
143
135 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
136 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
137 See 36 U.S.C. § 380; 483 U.S. 522.
138 36 U.S.C. § 380.
139 483 U.S. at 527.
140 Id. at 542.
141 Id. at 547.
142 21 C.F.R. §§ 1271.50(b)(1)(i), 1271.75(a)(1) (2007).
143 See Culhane, supra note 25, at 139 n.71. The article also suggests that, "[a]lthough recom-
mendations are, by definition, not requirements, it seems highly unlikely that any establishment
that wished to retain its license would ignore them." Id. at 139.
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Although the argument is certainly plausible, there is no guarantee that
a court will find encouragement or coercion even under these facts. The Su-
preme Court has traditionally been unwilling to commit itself to an particular
test, and continues to determine state action on a case-by-case basis.44 A claim
of state action under this theory also creates cause for concern when considering
the significant percentage of establishments that have a long history of exclud-
ing potential MSM donors. Clearly it is difficult to argue governmental encour-
agement and coercion when the discriminatory practices existed prior to the
government's public recommendations. Unless there is credible evidence that
the government induced these long-standing MSM exclusionary policies, the
available pool of defendants under this doctrine is limited.
b. Are there Sufficient Mutual Contacts between the Gov-
ern,::ent and the Private Sperm Bank?
Second, the government may have so many mutually beneficial contacts
with certain private facilities that those facilities' MSM-exclusionary policies
effectively become its own. When analyzing state action under the "mutual
contacts" doctrine, courts will consider whether the contacts between the private
actor and the government represent a "symbiotic relationship."' 145 A symbiotic
relationship exists when a private entity's actions are tangentially beneficial to
both itself and the government. 146 To break it down even further, the cases that
generally arise under this doctrine are divided into three separate subcategories
("strains"): (1) where the government extensively regulates the private entity,
(2) where there are wide-ranging physical and economic contacts between the
government and the private entity, and (3) where the government directly aids or
grants a subsidy to the private entity. 47 The Note will now briefly examine the
applicability of each of these strains and their likelihood of success in this case.
i. Does the Government Render the Private
Sperm Bank a State Actor Through Its Regula-
tions?
On a basic level, the federal government and all private sperm banks
have a certain degree of mutuality. The federal government regulates all sperm
banks and clinics by making compliance with FDA regulations mandatory.
148
But the Supreme Court has been reluctant to find state action in situations in
144 ROTUNDA, supra note 130, at 783.
145 JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONsTIuTIONAL LAW, 528 (6th ed. 2000).
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 21 C.F.R. § 1271.45(d) (stating that any establishment that determines who is eligible to
donate human cells, tissues, and cellular and tissue-based products "must comply with the re-
quirements contained in this subpart that are applicable to that function").
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which an otherwise private actor is subject to extensive governmental regulation
without something more. In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., a woman sued
a privately owned utility when it terminated her electric service without no-
tice. 1 49 In analyzing whether the government's extensive regulation of the pri-
vate company rendered the utility a state actor, the Court reasoned that the de-
ciding inquiry is whether there is a "sufficiently close nexus between the State
and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter
may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.' 150 The Court ultimately held
that the utility did not engage in state action because, despite its regulation, the
state did not "foster or encourage" the company's actions.' 5' Therefore, the
utility's actions could not be said to be those of the state.
Thus, it seems that the "something more" required when attributing
state action to governmentally regulated entities is some form of encourage-
ment. Essentially, this strain of the "mutual contacts" test is a mirror image of
the "encouragement" test articulated above. Here, unlike in Jackson, the FDA
has actively encouraged the exact conduct in question because it has consis-
tently recommended in published documents that private entities implement the
discriminatory eligibility requirements.
52
ii. Do the Government and the Private Sperm
Bank Have Enough Economic and Physical
Contacts to Constitute State Action?
In reality, this strand of the mutual contacts doctrine has little substan-
tive meaning, and is used primarily as a "catch all" provision. 53 When analyz-
ing physical and economic contacts, courts weigh the particular facts and cir-
cumstances of each case.' 54 Consequently, decisions have often been inconsis-
tent, and the criteria remain unclear. 155 Because, however, this strand of mutual
contacts tends to involve the economic relationship between the government and
a private entity, it can easily be analyzed in conjunction with the third strand:
149 419 U.S. 345,347 (1974).
150 Id. at 351 (citing Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176 (1972)).
151 419 U.S. at 358.
152 See supra Part V.A. L.a.
153 NOWAK, supra note 145, at 532. "[It may be said that when a private individual becomes
so entangled with government policies that his actions appear to have the authorization of the
state, it is likely that a majority of the Justices of the Supreme Court will find state action in his
activities." Id.
154 See id.
155 See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 145.
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iii. Does the Government Render the Private
Sperm Bank a State Actor by Bestowing Subsi-
dies or Direct Federal Aid?
In short, the answer is no. Health care in the United States is largely
decentralized, and most public fertility services are unsubsidized and "develop
within a lightly regulated... free market framework."'' 56 Further, private fertil-
ity clinics receive virtually no government funding. 57 Therefore, the lack of an
economic relationship in this case likely renders these two particular variations
of state action through "mutual contacts" inapplicable.
In sum, the "mutual contacts" test is fractured, inconsistent, and not
likely a viable route to claim that the private action at issue is "fairly attributable
to the state." The best chance for success under this theory is to claim that the
FDA's overall regulatory scheme encourages the private action. But as ex-
plained above, this is really just an indirect way of arguing under the first theory
of state action-that the state encourages or coerces the action-and it provides
little if any substantive advantage.
c. Are the Government and the Private Sperm Bank En-
twined?
Before Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic
Ass'n, the Supreme Court had long rejected the notion that state action is present
merely when a private entity and the government are entwined.1 58 But in this
2001 decision, the Supreme Court found that a private athletic association en-
gaged in state action for just that reason. 59 The Court reasoned that the "nomi-
nally private character of the Association is overborne by the pervasive en-
twinement of public institutions and public officials in its composition and
workings .... ,60 What seemed to matter most to the Court was that eighty-
156 June Carbone & Paige Gottheim, Markets, Subsidies, Regulation, and Trust: Building Ethi-
cal Understandings into the Market for Fertility Services, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 509, 532
(2006).
157 Id.
158 See generally Megan M. Cooper, Dusting Off the Old Play Book: How the Supreme Court
Disregarded the Blum Trilogy, Returned to the Theories of the Past, and Found State Action
Through Entwinement in Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 35
CREIGHTON L. REV. 913 (2002).
159 See generally Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288
(2001) ("The issue is whether a statewide association incorporated to regulate interscholastic
athletic competition among public and private secondary schools may be regarded as engaging in
state action .... The association in question here includes most public schools located within the
State, acts through their representatives, draws its officers from them, is largely funded by their
dues and income received in their stead, and has historically been seen to regulate in lieu of the
State Board of Education's exercise of its own authority.").
16o Id. at 298.
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four percent of the association's membership was comprised of public
schools.
61
But what does the decision really tell us? How much entwinement is
necessary before courts will find state action? The Brentwood Court does not
specifically define entwinement, but instead finds state action because the rela-
tionship between the state and the private association created an overlapping
identity.162 In this decision, the Court seems to be moving in a direction in
which it examines the totality of the circumstances, and where indirect, as op-
posed to direct, involvement with the challenged conduct may be enough to
trigger state action.1 63 The result is a less rigid and more inclusive means by
which wronged parties may challenge otherwise private actors.
When applying the entwinement doctrine to private sperm banks and
fertility clinics, the results will vary case-by-case. Whether there is government
entwinement may depend on a number of factors, for example: whether the re-
productive facility employs the services and staff of state hospitals or clinics;
whether it receives reproductive samples from other public clinics; whether it
sends its reproductive samples to other public clinics; whether its employees are
guaranteed state benefits; and whether its decision-making process is controlled
or in any way directed by public officials. A complete analysis of these and
other similar criteria is necessary to determine whether, in a particular case, the
totality of the circumstances supports a finding of government entwinement.
When and if an attorney believes that she can make a convincing argument for a
finding of state action in an otherwise private sperm bank, she may then con-
sider which substantive claims to bring.
2. Possible Substantive Claims
a. Equal Protection and the Fundamental Right to Pro-
create
In Skinner v. Oklahoma,164 the Supreme Court engaged in an Equal Pro-
tection Clause analysis of Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act.
165
The case involved a defendant who was convicted under the statute once for
stealing chickens, and twice for robbery with firearms.' 66 The statute provided
that a court had the power to order the sexual sterilization of any person who
161 Id. at 299. The Court also noted that the Association's governing council consisted entirely
of members of representatives from public schools, and that the Association's employees were
eligible for retirement benefits established from a fund made for public school teachers. Id. See
Cooper, supra note 158, at 923.
162 See Cooper, supra note 158, at 983.
163 Id. at 984.
164 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
165 Id. at 536.
166 Id. at 537.
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had been convicted three times or more for felonies involving "moral turpi-
tude."' 67 Unfortunately for the defendant, the crimes that he committed were
included in those that the legislature had classified as amounting to moral turpi-
tude. 68 If he had embezzled property amounting to more than twenty dollars
rather than stealing from a stranger, however, the Act would not have applied to
him. 169
Justice Douglas opened the opinion with the following statement: "This
case touches a sensitive and important area of human rights. Oklahoma de-
prives certain individuals of a right which is basic to the perpetuation of a
race-the right to have offspring."'' 70 The Court ultimately found the statute
unconstitutional on a number of grounds, one being that it violated the funda-
mental right to procreate under the Equal Protection Clause.' 71 The statute, by
its emphasis on only certain types of felonies, essentially punished people dif-
ferently who committed two similar crimes. The Court reasoned, "When the
law lays an unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same
quality of offense and sterilizes one and not the other, it has made as an invidi-
ous a discrimination as if it had selected a particular race or nationality for op-
pressive treatment."'
172
While the Act at issue in Skinner is not literally analogous to the FDA's
recommendation, it bears striking symbolic similarities. For many men who
cannot-by virtue of their same-sex relationships-father their own children but
want to have offspring, sperm banks and fertility clinics could provide the
means. 173 While most establishments bar donations from men who have had sex
with another man in the previous five-year period, they freely accept donations
from other high-risk persons after one only one year has passed, and never bar
men solely because they have had unprotected sex with a woman. Yet all of
these "offenses" are of the same quality: each of the persons mentioned above
poses a similar degree of risk (unless the man who has had sex with another man
practiced safe sex, in which case his risk is much lower), but reproductive facili-
ties lay an "unequal hand" upon each.
Many men choose to be in long-term, committed relationships with
other men. Just like most other couples, these men might choose to express
themselves and show their affection for one another through sexual intimacy.
167 Id. at 536-37.
168 Id. at 538-39.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 536.
171 Id. at 541.
172 Id. (emphasis added).
173 Fertility clinics also provide reproductive possibilities for single straight men and women,
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These men may also have the desire to produce genetic offspring, 174 and may
feel that donating their sperm is their only procreative option. 75  However,
unless these men choose to forgo sexual intimacy in their relationships for five
years, most sperm banks will not consider them as potential donors. Because
men in gay relationships (and perhaps the majority of all persons in romantic
relationships) would not seriously entertain a five-year period of celibacy, the
eligibility requirement serves as constructive sterilization. In effect, sperm
banks classify persons who are eligible to procreate on the real or perceived
basis of sexual orientation. As the court in Skinner cautioned, "The power to
sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects. In
evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types which are inimical to the domi-
nant group to wither and disappear."
176
Because courts have yet to hold that classifications based on sexual ori-
entation are suspect, 177 an argument that the eligibility requirement discrimi-
nates against gays would trigger only rational basis review. 178 While it is cer-
tainly possible to argue that the policy is not rationally related to an interest in
promoting health,179 ideally, one hopes to trigger strict scrutiny review. By
framing the eligibility requirement as a significant interference with the funda-
mental right to procreate, however, a creative attorney may be able to do just
that. 80 Under Skinner, If the eligibility criterion for donating sperm was found
174 See Carson Strong, Ethical and Legal Aspects of Semen Retrieval After Death or Persistent
Vegetative State, 27 J. L. MED. & ETHnCS, 347, 349 (1999) (citing many reasons that procreation
may be important to an individual). "[W]hether one has participated in the creation of a person
can be part of one's self-identity. Similarly, whether one has gestated, reared, or obtained a certain
kind of link to the future can be part of one's sense of who one is. These reasons also suggest that
procreating can contribute to self-fulfillment .... " Id.
175 One sperm bank, Rainbow Flag Health Services, recognizes that many gay men desire to
biologically bring a child into the world. To address this very real need, it actively recruits gay
donors. The sperm bank has implemented a policy in which a child bom as the result of artificial
insemination will know the identity of her donor. In return for the sperm donation, the bank does
not pay donors for their semen. The bank reasons: "Your child will grow up knowing that the
main reason their donor helped you bring children into your family was that he wanted children in
his own life, even though he did not want to raise children himself. They will know [that] their
donor's main motivation was not the $50 per visit most sperm banks pay donors." Rainbow Flag
Health Services, http://www.gayspermbank.com/index1.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2007).
176 316 U.S. at 541.
177 See generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (applying only rational basis review to
a Colorado constitutional amendment prohibiting all legislative, executive, or judicial action de-
signed to protect homosexuals from discrimination).
178 16B AM. JuR. 2D Constitutional Law § 813 (2007) ("Governmental classifications that do
not target suspect classes or groups or fundamental interests are subject only to the more deferen-
tial rational basis review.").
179 See supra Part IV.C.
180 See Regan v. Taxation Without Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983) (stating
that classifications are valid if they bear a rational relation to a legitimate government purpose, but
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to interfere with a right to procreate, the court would then have to decide
whether excluding men who have had sex with another man within the previous
five-year period, but not men who have had sex with women (protected or not),
is the least restrictive way to prevent the transmission of disease. By emphasiz-
ing the shorter exclusionary periods for other high risks and the lack of restric-
tions on unsafe heterosexual sex, a court would be disingenuous to find that the
current restrictions are the least restrictive.
Unfortunately, the problem is one of convincing the judiciary that do-
nating sperm falls within the definition of procreation. As artificial reproductive
technology (ART) has advanced over the last decade, the American legal system
has struggled with this very issue. How do we classify sperm donors? What
protections are they afforded? Where does ART fit into our traditional under-
standing of what it means to procreate?
Early conceptions of the legal obligations and rights of sperm donors
were limiting. The Uniform Parentage Act of 1973 stated that a child born as
the result of artificial insemination from an anonymous sperm donor was the
legal child of the mother's husband, leaving the genetic father out of the equa-
tion.' 18 The legal protections for sperm donors remained sparse until a 2002
amendment to the Uniform Parentage Act expanded the definition of a legal
father to include sperm donors who intend to be the parent of the child.1
8 2
While these and other recent acts have attempted to stipulate when
sperm donors are and are not entitled to parental rights, they fail to address the
separate issue of a sperm donor's procreative rights. Still, some courts seem to
have meshed the two distinct concepts into one. For instance, in Johnson v.
Calvert, the California Supreme Court resolved a custody dispute in favor of a
biological mother over a surrogate mother, explaining that "she who intended to
procreate the child-that is, she who intended to bring about the birth of a child
that she intended to raise as her own-is the natural mother ....,, Does the
California Supreme Court decision really stand for the proposition that one can
only procreate when he intends to raise the resulting child? Would this deci-
sion imply that fathers and mothers who intend to abort a child or put a child up
for adoption have not procreated? Because the court considered procreation in
the narrow realm of parental custody, it is difficult to determine what, if any,
differences might result if the court had more broadly addressed procreation as
it relates to donors involved in ART.
Although the precise question has not yet been answered by American
courts, foreign authority and academic commentary provide some insight. For
example, in a property dispute over a deceased man's frozen sperm, a French
court reasoned that sperm is the "genetic expression" of a person's fundamental
181 UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 5 (1973). See David D. Meyer, Parenthood in A Time of Transi-
tion: Tensions between Legal, Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMP.
L. 125, 134 (2006).
182 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 703 (2002).
183 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993).
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right to create life.184 In addition, several commentators have written on artifi-
cial reproductive technologies, discussing the implications of donating sperm.
One author classifies procreation simply as the "union of sperm and egg," and
lists as the known methods of procreation, "sexual intercourse, artificial insemi-
nation, and in vitro fertilization."' 85 Another author specifically distinguishes
"procreation by means of sperm donations" from traditional definitions. 186 A
third commentator, however, argues that a fundamental right to procreate exists
only in conjunction with three elements: genetics, a social experience, and ges-
tation. 187 "The introduction of a third-party surrogate [or sperm donor] alters the
social understanding of procreation and cannot be understood to be an arrange-
ment that is 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.""0
88
Obviously the question is still open for debate. Still, the recent ad-
vances in, and uses of, ART lend support to the argument that the right to pro-
create extends far beyond the historically recognized methods of procreation.
The argument for an expanded definition of procreation, although challenging,
is ripe for the making.
b. Equal Protection and the Fundamental Privacy Right to
Sexual Intimacy?
As the Supreme Court developed its modem jurisprudence, it slowly
began to identify certain privacy rights that stem from the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's guarantee of personal "liberty." 189 These privacy rights, the Court ex-
plains, are guaranteed only if they are deemed "fundamental," or "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty."' 9 Thus, the right to privacy is not without limita-
tions. Some governmental intrusions may be warranted if a state "properly as-
sert[s] important interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical stan-
dards, and in protecting potential life."'19'
184 See Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Creteil,
Aug. 1, 1984, Gaz. du Pal. 1984, 2, pan. jurispr. 560; see also Gail A. Katz, Protecting Intent in
Reproductive Technology, 11 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 683 (1998).
185 Elizabeth Price Foley, The Constitutional Implications of Human Cloning, 42 ARiz. L. REV.
647, 651 (2000) (emphasis added).
186 See Schiff, supra note 46, at 567.
187 Roger J. Chin, Assisted Reproductive Technologies Legal Issues in Procreation, 8 LOY.
CONSutMER L. REV. 190, 209, 214 (1996).
188 Id. at 214.
189 See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (right to marital privacy);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (right to privacy in individual's decision to bear or
beget a child); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (right to privacy in woman's decision to
terminate pregnancy).
190 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
191 Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
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In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court considered, but did not di-
rectly determine, whether a statute that criminalized same-sex sodomy violated
a privacy interest.1 92 In its opinion, the Court provided an in-depth discussion of
the privacy interest at stake, and stated that the statute's penalties and purposes
have "far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human con-
duct, sexual behavior ....,19 It went on to reason as follows: "When sexuality
finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can
be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty pro-
tected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this
choice."' 94 While the Court acknowledged that liberty affords "substantial pro-
tection" to matters pertaining to sex, it never directly states that the privacy right
to sexual intimacy is fundamental. 195 Instead, the Supreme Court holds, without
articulating a clear standard of review, that the statute serves no legitimate state
interest.
96
What legal principles come from the Court's holding in Lawrence?
Does use of the language "legitimate interest" signal that the Court applied ra-
tional basis review, or does the discussion of the liberty interest in sexual inti-
macy mean that it found a fundamental privacy right subject to strict scrutiny?
Recently, this question has been debated by numerous scholars. Some focus on
the Court's use of the phrase "legitimate interest," and theorize that the Law-
rence Court failed to identify a fundamental right and applied nothing more than
rational basis review.1 97  Another commentator proposes that the Lawrence
Court took the first step towards ending the practice of identifying fundamental
rights altogether. 198 This author suggests that the Supreme Court may be trying
to prevent lower courts from applying a "mechanistic tiered approach to judicial
review," and is instead encouraging a more "searching" evaluation of practices
that disadvantage identifiable groups of people. 99 Still, others argue that the
Court did, in fact, identify a fundamental right and applied strict scrutiny to an
infringement of that right; these scholars reason that the court's extensive recita-
tion of cases addressing and finding fundamental rights would have otherwise
been unnecessary. 2°°  "The discussion places the claimed right in Lawrence
192 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003).
193 Id. at 567.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 572.
196 Id. at 578.
197 Meghan M. Peterson, Note, The Right Decision for the Wrong Reason: the Supreme Court
Correctly Invalidates the Texas Homosexual Sodomy Statute, but Rather than Finding an Equal
Protection Violation in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court Incorrectly and Unnecessarily Overrules
Bowers v. Hardwick, 37 CREIGHTON L. REv. 653, 707 (2004).
198 Arthur S. Leonard, Lawrence v. Texas and the New Law of Gay Rights, 30 OHIo N.U. L.
REV. 189, 209 (2004).
199 Id.
200 Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence Libertarian?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1140, 1156 (2004).
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squarely within the context of the prior cases involving a fundamental liberty to
engage in private sexual conduct. '2 '
Unfortunately, the Lawrence holding will remain ambiguous until the
Supreme Court has a chance to reexamine the decision. Thus, if one chooses to
argue that a ban on MSM sperm donors violates an alleged "right to privacy,"
she must prepare for and analyze the merits of this claim under both rational
basis and strict scrutiny review. The question then becomes this: is a liberty
interest in sexual intimacy violated under the Equal Protection clause when a
sperm bank inquires about and penalizes more harshly gay sexual acts? Un-
doubtedly, a sperm bank has both a legitimate and compelling interest in pro-
tecting health. Under rational basis review, however, their inquiry into sexual
practices need only be rationally related to promoting health. As discussed in
Part LV.C. of this Note, there is a strong argument that it is not.202 If there is, in
fact, a fundamental privacy right to sexual intimacy, however, the sperm bank
must show that the penalization of gay sex acts, but not straight sex acts, is the
least restrictive way to promote health. If an attorney can show that the sperm
bank can protect health by inquiring into the safety of all potential donors' sex
acts rather than the biological (or even medically-altered) sex of their sexual
partners, the analysis more clearly supports-and, arguably, dictates-a finding
that the policy is not the least restrictive means. Once again, this is uncharted
territory, and to win, a litigator must think and argue creatively.
B. Claims Under State Constitutions
1. Is There State Action? Is State Action Even Required?
The U.S. Constitution ordinarily restrains private parties only when they
are directly influenced by, act concurrently with, represent or engage in, or oth-
erwise symbolize that their actions are those of the state.20 3 This is a long-
established principle deeply rooted in constitutional jurisprudence. 2°4 Whether
state constitutions require government action to reach otherwise private dis-
crimination, however, is not as clear. While many courts have considered state
action in the context of speech and property rights, equal protection guarantees
in state constitutions remain vague as to their effect on private parties.20 5
201 Id.
202 See supra Part IV.C.
203 John Devlin, Constructing an Alternative to "State Action" as a Limit on State Constitu-
tional Rights Guarantees: A Survey, Critique, and Proposal, 21 RurGERs L. J. 819, 821 (1990).
204 See id. at 821-22 ("Rooted in both a general view of the role of constitutions and the par-
ticular language of the federal Constitution, the state action doctrine is a generalized limitation on
virtually all federal constitutional rights.").
205 Id. at 838.
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Part of the confusion stems from the divergent wording in various con-
stitutions' equal protection provisions. 2°6 Some directly or implicitly require
government action, and some expressly extend protection to private actors; but
the majority does not textually address state action.207 Not surprisingly, courts
interpreting the textually ambiguous provisions have come down both ways.
These decisions generally fall under two categories: those addressing textual
provisions providing for "equal protection of the laws," and those addressing
textual provisions providing for "equal protection under the law. 2 °8 Although
the majority of courts has ultimately concluded that state action is required un-
der both variations, only in the "equal protection of the law" provisions has that
sentiment been unanimous. 209 Those courts finding that government involve-
ment is not requisite have "effectively read the phrase 'under the law' out of the
provision as a meaningful threshold restriction. 2 0
For the purposes of this Note, an expansive survey of equal protection
provisions in state constitutions and the level of state action that they require is
unwarranted. But scholarly works on the subject are available.21 An attorney
considering whether to file suit against a private establishment under a state
constitutional equal protection provision should also become familiar with that
constitution's textual requirements and the courts' interpretations.
2. Same Claims, Broader Protections
"It is a well-recognized principle that a state court is free to interpret its
state constitution in any way that does not violate principles of federal law, and
thereby grant individuals more rights than those provided by the U.S. Constitu-
tion. 21 2 Indeed, many state courts have treated the U.S. Constitution as merely
206 See generally Devlin, supra note 203.
207 See Id. at 839-40; see also Helen Hershkoff, State Constitutions: A National Perspective, 3
WIDENER J. PUB. L. 7, 20 (1993).
208 See Devlin, supra note 203, at 843-47 (providing a summary and analysis of various deci-
sions addressing the two contrasting constitutional provisions) (emphasis added).
209 See id.
210 Id. at 845-46 (discussing Pennsylvania courts' opinions, which have concluded that claims
under the state constitution need not allege any degree of government involvement) (emphasis
added).
211 See generally, e.g., id. (providing an in-depth analysis of various state constitutional provi-
sions and judicial opinions that interpret the provisions, and then proposing solutions to the state
action dilemma); Hershkoff, supra note 207 (highlighting various rights and protections that state
constitutions afford, how they differ from the U.S. Constitution, and why claims under state con-
stitutions are strategically beneficial); Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Evolution of Equality in State
Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L. J. 1013 (2003) (analyzing state equal protection clauses spe-
cifically).
212 JOHN E. NOWAK, RONALD D. ROTUNDA & J. NELSON YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 21 (3d
ed. 1986); See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); Cooper v. California,
386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967).
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the foundation upon which civil liberties are built,213 and have greatly extended
their own constitutional protections pursuant to state-vested police power. Such
expanded protections have proved helpful in securing privacy rights for gays
and other minority groups. As a result, litigators have increasingly looked to
state constitutions as a source of protection for clients.214 Because the Supreme
Court has consistently held that procreation is a fundamental right under the
U.S. Constitution 215 and that state constitutions shall not provide anything less
than the rights provided by the U.S. Constitution,216 an analysis of "the right to
procreation" claims would be redundant. This section, therefore, will focus
solely on the more ambiguous right to privacy.21 7
In a string of cases addressing state anti-sodomy statutes, courts have
identified fundamental privacy rights that greatly exceed those provided by the
U.S. Constitution. In Powell v. State, the Georgia Supreme Court explicitly
stated that "the right to be let alone" provided by the Georgia constitution "is far
more extensive than the right of privacy protected by the U.S. Constitution. 218
The court then went even further and reasoned that it could not think of a right
more fundamental than the right of consenting adults to "engage in ...un-
forced, private, adult sexual activity. '219 The court, applying strict scrutiny to
the governmental intrusion into the right of sexual privacy, found that the intru-
sion was not "narrowly tailored" to the state's interest in preventing sexual as-
sault because it was "unduly oppressive upon the persons regulated.,
220
More closely related to the eligibility criterion at issue here, the Mon-
tana and Kentucky Supreme Courts analyzed same-sex anti-sodomy statutes and
found similar fundamental privacy rights, but addressed a different asserted state
interest: protecting and promoting public health. First, in Commonwealth v.
Wasson, the Kentucky Supreme Court provided a lengthy recitation of its cases
concerning fundamental privacy rights and concluded that the Kentucky Consti-
tution confers a privacy right to "be let alone" and to enjoy life "in the way most
agreeable and pleasant.' 221 The court then engaged in an equal protection
analysis, stating that the clause "protects minorities from discriminatory treat-
ment at the hands of the majority. Its purpose is not to protect traditional values
213 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 492 (Ky. 1992) ("We are not bound
by decisions of the United States Supreme Court when deciding whether a state statute impermis-
sibly infringes upon individual rights guaranteed in the State Constitution so long as state constitu-
tional protection does not fall below the federal floor.").
214 See Hershkoff, supra note 207, at 21-22 (noting that the American Civil Liberties Union has
increasingly employed state constitutions due to their unique features and broader protections).
215 See generally Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
216 See generally Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 487.
217 See also supra Part V.A.2.b.
218 510 S.E.2d 18, 22 (Ga. 1998).
219 Id. at 24.
220 Id. at 25.
221 842 S.W.2d at 496.
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and practices, but to call into question such values and practices when they op-
erate to burden disadvantaged minorities .... The state claimed that it has
an interest in protecting health, and that the statute was justified because same-
sex anal sodomy more readily transmits infectious diseases.223 The court re-
jected the notion that the statute even rationally related to the state's interest due
to the "stark evidence that AIDS is not only a homosexual disease., 22 4 Medical
evidence ruled out the distinction between male to male and male to female anal
sex as a method to prevent disease transmission.2 5 The court concluded that the
statute's purpose was to single out gays for different treatment.
22 6
Next, in Gryczan v. State, 7 the Montana Supreme Court's analysis of
the privacy rights at issue was simplified because the state constitution explicitly
grants such rights: "The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being
of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling
state interest. '228 In light of the provision, the court noted that there could
hardly be a right more fundamental and deserving of protection than the right to
consensual adult sexual activity. 219 Consequently, the court was left to deter-
mine whether the state's same-sex anti-sodomy statute was narrowly tailored to
its asserted interest in protecting public health. For the following reasons, the
court reasoned that it was not:
The state's assertion that the statute protects public health by
containing the spread of AIDS relies on faulty logic and invalid
assumptions about the disease .... [T]he State's rationale as-
sumes that all same-gender conduct contributes to the spread of
the disease. This is grossly inaccurate. AIDS and HIV, the vi-
rus that causes AIDS, are transmitted through the exchange of
HIV-infected semen or blood, as can occur during vaginal, anal
and oral intercourse . . . . [H]eterosexual contact is now the
leading mode of HIV transmission in this country. . . . [T]he
incidence of AIDS (newly reported cases) is growing most rap-
idly among heterosexuals. In fact, the proportion of yearly re-
ported AIDS cases resulting from heterosexual sex has in-
creased steadily over time, multiplying by more than 5 times
between 1985 and 1995. In this same time period, the risk
group designated "men who have sex with men" has accounted
222 Id. at 499 (quoting Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 718 (9th Cir. 1989)).
223 Id. at 500.
224 Id. at 501.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997).
228 MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
229 942 P.2d at 123.
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for a steadily decreasing proportion of newly reported AIDS
cases, decreasing by more than 20% between 1985 and 1995.
.... In addition, the statute does not account for "safe" versions
of the activities, i.e., use of a condom during any "sexual con-
duct" which greatly reduces or eliminates the risk of HIV
transmission. Thus, the inclusion of behavior not associated
with the spread of AIDS and HIV and the exclusion of high-risk
behavior among those other than homosexuals indicate the ab-
sence of any clear relationship between the statute and any pub-
lic health goals.23°
The dicta contained in this analysis could hardly be more relevant or on-point.
Accordingly, for claims which allege that MSM exclusionary policies
violate privacy rights, employing state constitutions as sources of civil rights
and liberties provides at least three strategic benefits. First, as discussed above,
many courts have interpreted state constitutions to provide broader privacy
rights than those of the U.S. Constitution.231 The broad definition that many
states have adopted includes the fundamental right to engage in consensual sex-
ual acts. Second, because the right to engage in consensual sexual acts is fun-
damental, the reproductive facility's screening of same-sex sexual acts must be
the least restrictive means to promote its interest in preserving health (which, as
illustrated throughout the Note, it is not). Third, unlike the Supreme Court, sev-
eral state courts have already addressed same-sex regulations drafted to "pro-
mote health," and have found the underlying rationale to be "grossly inaccu-
rate. 232 In this case, the precedent weighs strongly in favor of a finding of un-
constitutional privacy violations.
VI. CONCLUSION
If representing a man who is denied the opportunity to donate sperm be-
cause of his sexual orientation or sexual practices, choosing the litigation strat-
230 Id. at 123-24.
231 See, e.g., Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332 (Ariz. 2002); Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112
(Mont. 1997); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tn. Ct. App. 1996); Commonwealth v.
Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992); Texas State Emp. Union v. Dept. of Mental Health, 746
S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 1987); State v. Sanders, 381 A.2d 333 (N.J. 1977) (representing cases in which
courts have interpreted the right of privacy guaranteed by state constitutions to extend beyond the
rights provided by the U.S. Constitution).
232 Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 124 (Mont. 1997). The court further stated, "With few
exceptions not at issue here, all adults regardless of gender, fully and properly expect that their
consensual sexual activities will not be subject to the prying eyes of others or to governmental
snooping or regulation." Id. at 122 (emphasis added). But even if there is an interest in "snoop-
ing" into the sexual activities of consenting adults when it relates to the health of others, that
interest in snooping is only legitimately advanced if it is "regardless of gender." Id.
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egy that best fits both the client's needs and the relevant legal environment is
key. Who is the aggrieved party, and what is his story? Should he file suit
against the FDA for recommending the eligibility requirement, or against the
local sperm bank which implemented that recommendation? What are the
available legal arguments? What are the strengths and weaknesses of each ar-
gument? What are the ramifications of a potential victory against the FDA?
Against a specific sperm bank?
To file suit against the FDA and win would be groundbreaking. It
would send a message to the entire industry that discrimination based on sexual
orientation or the gender of a person's sexual partner is unacceptable, and the
FDA would be forced to abandon its policy. Under the APA's provisions con-
cerning judicial review, however, a suit against the FDA would trigger some-
thing akin to mere rational basis review, if not even less scrutinizing. 233 While
the facts might weigh strongly against the lawfulness of the FDA's recommen-
dation, the precise degree of deference that a court will choose to afford the
FDA's fact-finding is unclear. How "searching and careful" will the court's
inquiry be? Moreover, even if a court were to rule against the FDA, the ruling
would not be binding on the regulated industry. Some establishments may
choose to keep their own eligibility requirements in tact.
To file suit against a sperm bank or similar reproductive facility and win
also has the potential to be groundbreaking, but only depending upon the ulti-
mate choice of law. For instance, a win in federal court under the U.S. Constitu-
tion would reverberate nationally and shape the entire industry. The drawbacks,
however, are that the Supreme Court has not explicitly articulated a right to pri-
vacy in sexual activity, and the issue of whether donating sperm constitutes pro-
creation is novel. The arguments are certainly viable, but the precedent is not
entirely on-point.
Conversely, a win in state court under any particular state constitution
would not bind the rest of the country, and it would have minimal impact on the
industry as a whole. But the advantage to this choice of law strategy is that un-
der certain state constitutions, a court may review a privacy claim under strict
scrutiny depending upon whether a particular constitutional provision has been
interpreted to include the right to sexual intimacy under fundamental privacy
rights. Unfortunately, while arguing under state constitutions may be a desir-
able choice of law strategy, many states' preliminary "state action" hurdle may
prevent the court from deciding the case based on the merits if the entity at issue
is private.
Each strategy has its faults, and none will guarantee a victory. Creative
lawyering is thus essential. And apart from the legal theories discussed here,
there may even be other more readily available alternatives. For instance, many
cities and states have enacted anti-discrimination ordinances and statutes that
may be applicable. Furthermore, some state courts have interpreted their consti-
233 See Garland, supra note 98, at 532 and accompanying text.
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tutions to include sexual orientation as a suspect classification.3 But regardless
of the legal strategies employed, courts must reach the correct result: eligibility
requirements should be based on science, not stereotypes.
Luke A. Boso*
234 See Shaman, supra note 211, at 1070-77.
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